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4.4 KiB
ReStructuredText
97 lines
4.4 KiB
ReStructuredText
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.. _securitybugs:
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Security bugs
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=============
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Linux kernel developers take security very seriously. As such, we'd
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like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
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disclosed as quickly as possible. Please report security bugs to the
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Linux kernel security team.
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Contact
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-------
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The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
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<security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers
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who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
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If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
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that can speed up the process considerably. It is possible that the
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security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
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understand and fix the security vulnerability.
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As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
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will be to diagnose and fix. Please review the procedure outlined in
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'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what
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information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
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be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
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made public.
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Please send plain text emails without attachments where possible.
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It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex
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issue if all the details are hidden away in attachments. Think of it like a
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:doc:`regular patch submission <../process/submitting-patches>`
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(even if you don't have a patch yet): describe the problem and impact, list
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reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text.
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Disclosure and embargoed information
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------------------------------------
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The security list is not a disclosure channel. For that, see Coordination
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below.
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Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts. Fixes
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for publicly known bugs are released immediately.
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Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
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as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
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the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
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of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
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if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time. The
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only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
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the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
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coordination.
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While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
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order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
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the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
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reporter. This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
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and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
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identity of the reporter.
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In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed. All other
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information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
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of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
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lifted, in perpetuity.
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Coordination
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------------
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Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
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escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
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<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
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are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
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upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
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will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
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publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
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the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
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include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
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the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
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<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
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CVE assignment
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--------------
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The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them
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for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and
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may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
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assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
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linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
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before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
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message if the reporter agrees.
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Non-disclosure agreements
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-------------------------
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The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable
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to enter any non-disclosure agreements.
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