linux-zen-server/drivers/misc/lkdtm/fortify.c

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2023-08-30 17:53:23 +02:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright (c) 2020 Francis Laniel <laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com>
*
* Add tests related to fortified functions in this file.
*/
#include "lkdtm.h"
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
static volatile int fortify_scratch_space;
static void lkdtm_FORTIFY_STR_OBJECT(void)
{
struct target {
char a[10];
int foo;
} target[3] = {};
/*
* Using volatile prevents the compiler from determining the value of
* 'size' at compile time. Without that, we would get a compile error
* rather than a runtime error.
*/
volatile int size = 20;
pr_info("trying to strcmp() past the end of a struct\n");
strncpy(target[0].a, target[1].a, size);
/* Store result to global to prevent the code from being eliminated */
fortify_scratch_space = target[0].a[3];
pr_err("FAIL: fortify did not block a strncpy() object write overflow!\n");
pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE);
}
static void lkdtm_FORTIFY_STR_MEMBER(void)
{
struct target {
char a[10];
char b[10];
} target;
volatile int size = 20;
char *src;
src = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
strscpy(src, "over ten bytes", size);
size = strlen(src) + 1;
pr_info("trying to strncpy() past the end of a struct member...\n");
/*
* strncpy(target.a, src, 20); will hit a compile error because the
* compiler knows at build time that target.a < 20 bytes. Use a
* volatile to force a runtime error.
*/
strncpy(target.a, src, size);
/* Store result to global to prevent the code from being eliminated */
fortify_scratch_space = target.a[3];
pr_err("FAIL: fortify did not block a strncpy() struct member write overflow!\n");
pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE);
kfree(src);
}
static void lkdtm_FORTIFY_MEM_OBJECT(void)
{
int before[10];
struct target {
char a[10];
int foo;
} target = {};
int after[10];
/*
* Using volatile prevents the compiler from determining the value of
* 'size' at compile time. Without that, we would get a compile error
* rather than a runtime error.
*/
volatile int size = 20;
memset(before, 0, sizeof(before));
memset(after, 0, sizeof(after));
fortify_scratch_space = before[5];
fortify_scratch_space = after[5];
pr_info("trying to memcpy() past the end of a struct\n");
pr_info("0: %zu\n", __builtin_object_size(&target, 0));
pr_info("1: %zu\n", __builtin_object_size(&target, 1));
pr_info("s: %d\n", size);
memcpy(&target, &before, size);
/* Store result to global to prevent the code from being eliminated */
fortify_scratch_space = target.a[3];
pr_err("FAIL: fortify did not block a memcpy() object write overflow!\n");
pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE);
}
static void lkdtm_FORTIFY_MEM_MEMBER(void)
{
struct target {
char a[10];
char b[10];
} target;
volatile int size = 20;
char *src;
src = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
strscpy(src, "over ten bytes", size);
size = strlen(src) + 1;
pr_info("trying to memcpy() past the end of a struct member...\n");
/*
* strncpy(target.a, src, 20); will hit a compile error because the
* compiler knows at build time that target.a < 20 bytes. Use a
* volatile to force a runtime error.
*/
memcpy(target.a, src, size);
/* Store result to global to prevent the code from being eliminated */
fortify_scratch_space = target.a[3];
pr_err("FAIL: fortify did not block a memcpy() struct member write overflow!\n");
pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE);
kfree(src);
}
/*
* Calls fortified strscpy to test that it returns the same result as vanilla
* strscpy and generate a panic because there is a write overflow (i.e. src
* length is greater than dst length).
*/
static void lkdtm_FORTIFY_STRSCPY(void)
{
char *src;
char dst[5];
struct {
union {
char big[10];
char src[5];
};
} weird = { .big = "hello!" };
char weird_dst[sizeof(weird.src) + 1];
src = kstrdup("foobar", GFP_KERNEL);
if (src == NULL)
return;
/* Vanilla strscpy returns -E2BIG if size is 0. */
if (strscpy(dst, src, 0) != -E2BIG)
pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() of 0 length did not return -E2BIG\n");
/* Vanilla strscpy returns -E2BIG if src is truncated. */
if (strscpy(dst, src, sizeof(dst)) != -E2BIG)
pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() did not return -E2BIG while src is truncated\n");
/* After above call, dst must contain "foob" because src was truncated. */
if (strncmp(dst, "foob", sizeof(dst)) != 0)
pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() dst does not contain \"foob\" but \"%s\"\n",
dst);
/* Shrink src so the strscpy() below succeeds. */
src[3] = '\0';
/*
* Vanilla strscpy returns number of character copied if everything goes
* well.
*/
if (strscpy(dst, src, sizeof(dst)) != 3)
pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() did not return 3 while src was copied entirely truncated\n");
/* After above call, dst must contain "foo" because src was copied. */
if (strncmp(dst, "foo", sizeof(dst)) != 0)
pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() dst does not contain \"foo\" but \"%s\"\n",
dst);
/* Test when src is embedded inside a union. */
strscpy(weird_dst, weird.src, sizeof(weird_dst));
if (strcmp(weird_dst, "hello") != 0)
pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() weird_dst does not contain \"hello\" but \"%s\"\n",
weird_dst);
/* Restore src to its initial value. */
src[3] = 'b';
/*
* Use strlen here so size cannot be known at compile time and there is
* a runtime write overflow.
*/
strscpy(dst, src, strlen(src));
pr_err("FAIL: strscpy() overflow not detected!\n");
pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE);
kfree(src);
}
static struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(FORTIFY_STR_OBJECT),
CRASHTYPE(FORTIFY_STR_MEMBER),
CRASHTYPE(FORTIFY_MEM_OBJECT),
CRASHTYPE(FORTIFY_MEM_MEMBER),
CRASHTYPE(FORTIFY_STRSCPY),
};
struct crashtype_category fortify_crashtypes = {
.crashtypes = crashtypes,
.len = ARRAY_SIZE(crashtypes),
};